of the usurpation of
all the earth.
296. When the question for consideration is whether we ought to make war and
kill so many men--condemn so many Spaniards to death--only one man is judge,
and he is an interested party. There should be a third, who is
disinterested.
297. Veri juris.[44] --We have it no more; if we had it, we should take
conformity to the customs of a country as the rule of justice. It is here
that, not finding justice, we have found force, etc.
298. Justice, might.--It is right that what is just should be obeyed; it is
necessary that what is strongest should be obeyed. Justice without might is
helpless; might without justice is tyrannical. Justice without might is
gainsaid, because there are always offenders; might without justice is
condemned. We must then combine justice and might and, for this end, make
what is just strong, or what is strong just.
Justice is subject to dispute; might is easily recognised and is not
disputed. So we cannot give might to justice, because might has gainsaid
justice and has declared that it is she herself who is just. And thus, being
unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong just.
299. The only universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary
affairs and of the majority in others. Whence comes this? From the might
which is in them. Hence it comes that kings, who have power of a different
kind, do not follow the majority of their ministers.
No doubt equality of goods is just; but, being unable to cause might to obey
justice, men have made it just to obey might. Unable to strengthen justice,
they have justified might; so that the